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Can Animals Attain Membership
Within a Human Social/Moral Group?
ABSTRACT
Justice is illustrated by how humans treat others. Human society can no longer be considered just if it
continues to treat animals instrumentally, disregarding the moral worth of each individual creature. Emile
Durkheim's division of labor theory offers a groundwork for providing animals limited rights within a
human-dominated society. Solidarity can be fostered between animals and humans by internalizing the
principle that all organisms are interdependent. This principle is the foundation for granting animals
moral status. By recognizing the role animals play in our society, we can acknowledge our obligations to
them. Utilizing a mechaorganic solidarity, humans can establish justification for moral treatment of
animals.
INTRODUCTION.
As long as non-human animals remain outside the limits of human animal1 social/moral groups, they will
be subjected to less than humane treatment. But can animals join the group? The benefit of group
membership is that it implies entitlement to moral treatment by all group members or, more specifically,
membership entails rights. The implication of rights is that others are obligated to respect them, which is
why many humans do not want to grant animals rights. This essay will attempt to ease a tension between
granting animals a right to moral treatment and the view that human needs come before animal needs. In
considering the middle ground, I will claim the feasibility of animal membership, albeit with limited
rights, within the human social/moral group. Emile Durkheim's Division of Labor in Society will be
utilized in determining the limits of social/moral group membership and the method of bonding humans
to animals into an interdependent social group.
One objection to granting animals rights through membership in a human social/moral group is the
common assumption that eligibility should be based upon the individual's ability, or potential, to
abide by the social norms of the group. In other words, members must be able to conform to the
group's norms. If it is determined that one cannot (and never will) adhere to the rules, then
membership is denied. Children are granted provisional membership because it is believed that once
a child is appropriately socialized and apprised of the goals of the group she will adopt both the
norms and the goals. Mentally impaired children are deemed capable of limited participation in both
norms and goals and granted a moderate membership. So it seems that being capable of adopting
the group's norms is necessary for inclusion.
The usual basis of denying animal membership is the claim that animals do not possess the potential
to adopt human social mores. The ability to work within a group is enhanced by adhering to the
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rules the group has adopted. Thus it seems apparent that animals can never be granted membership
based upon this one standard. However, some animals are capable of adhering to a limited
understanding of group norms and behave accordingly. Some animals are trained to obey their
masters. Could these animals be granted membership? This would be a very small group indeed;
animals in the wild would certainly never receive membership and most domesticated animals
exhibit very limited training. Many humans consider animals to be incapable of conscious,
intentional behavior. Instead their mannerisms are viewed as mere instinctual responses to their
environment. Yet it seems that the same case could be made for humans. When a person merely
adheres to norms due to socialization, he or she is not unlike the animal trained to behave in a
manner that is approved by its owner. Therefore, membership based merely upon the capability of
adhering to rules does not seem fully adequate for determining membership for animals, much less
humans. There must be an additional consideration that binds a group together, something beyond
the instances of shared social/moral norms.
DIVISION OF LABOR.
Durkheim's suggestion that groups are bound together by the division of labor (DOL) might provide
a better ground for membership, applying to both humans and animals. According to Durkheim,
DOL is a natural law, a phenomenon that occurs within organisms. Organisms participate in an
outward instantiation of this same phenomenon. Consider the human body. Its various systems
operate interdependently toward a successful goal; i.e., the survival of the organism. Humans also
work cooperatively towards a larger goal¾the survival of society.2 As society requires more
specialization to accomplish its goals, the bond between individuals becomes more necessary and
harder to break. At one time in history, social goals were limited to mere survival, which utilized a
very limited DOL. All members essentially carried out the same task of providing food and shelter.
Although there was inevitably some gender-based DOL, labor was nevertheless towards the same
goal. Men were concerned with providing protection and hunting meat. Women were restricted to
gathering other foods and rearing the very young. This illustrates the interdependence required for
the successful attainment of societal goals. As societal goals are now more sophisticated, DOL is no
longer based upon gender but instead upon education. The more complicated the goals¾e.g., space
exploration¾the more specialized the roles become among group members. If everyone carries out
the exact same task, progress is slow. If labor is divided, granting equal importance to the various
chores, a goal becomes not only more likely, but more quickly attainable.
Allowing Durkheim's claim that DOL is a natural law is not too difficult, since it does appear that
organisms function through interdependent systems. It also seems that current societies function
upon a wide DOL, whereas older human societies operated upon a very narrow DOL. What are the
implications of DOL? Why is it important and how does it relate to social/moral group
membership? The concept of DOL is important for Durkheim, because it is that which determines
the method of solidarity within a group. Groups are bound by their norms or rules. The rules
provide a framework for both society and individuals to interact. They inform the individual of what
are acceptable and unacceptable methods of interrelating. Without rules, there is no cohesion among
group members, disallowing one to know how to act. The nature of norms and their enforcement
vary according to Durkheim. Some rules are repressive, restricting certain behaviors; others are
merely restitutory in that they are applicable only when needed to reestablish the status quo. In
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/kanon.html[9/18/2009 5:08:19 PM]
order to work together, rules must be in place that permit or restrict behaviors.
Without restrictions or agreed upon ways of doing things, societal goals cannot be reached. As
goals become more intricate, so too norms. When survival was the only goal, the rules were solely
concerned with promoting survival. Once society adopted more goals that were difficult to attain,
rules increased in number and complexity. For example, Durkheim suggests a continuum between
mechanical and organic solidarity.3 The following chart will clarify the attributes of both forms of
solidarity. It seems plausible to assume that Durkheim viewed society evolving from a completely
mechanical mode of solidarity into a completely organically bound mode. The majority of current
social/moral groups reside somewhere between the two extremes of the continuum.4
Mechanical Solidarity
Individuals are more homogenous.
There is less DOL among members.
It is easier for an individual to attain membership.
Group solidarity is more easily lost.
Group norms are more repressive, utilizing punishment to ensure adherence.
Organic Solidarity
Individuals are more diversified.
There is more DOL among members.
It is more difficult for an individual to attain membership.
Group solidarity is at its strongest.
Group norms are less repressive and maintained in strictly restitutory manner with more
voluntary compliance.5
MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY.
At first glance it seems that animal membership cannot be accomplished utilizing Durkheim's DOL
and its influence upon group solidarity. However, closer scrutiny reveals that provisional
membership can and has occurred. Durkheim's consideration of primitive groups in The Elementary
Forms of Religious Life illustrates that while animals were sometimes killed to feed humans, it was
still done with moral consideration. Without delving too deeply into his analysis of primitive
groups, it is important to consider some key points. Animals were considered part of the clan; the
totem animal was usually revered and eaten only in sacred ceremonies (if at all). However, contact
between humans and animals was limited, making the rules regarding animals at this level very
simplistic¾eat or do not eat. Additionally, other animals were seen as part of the clan. Non-totem
animals were often granted special treatment, since they were viewed as members of other clans.
Animals used towards the goal of survival were often treated with respect for their function. Thus,
mass slaughter did not occur, nor was any part wasted. The group took life only when necessary
and utilized every scrap. An animal was seen as sacrificing itself for the others¾humans.
If one examines the above list in the context of mechanical solidarity, it is possible to see that
animals were seen as homogenous with humans. Ancient human cosmology included all of nature
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within the system, with humans occupying a small portion of the whole. Animals worked with
humans toward the same goal¾survival. Animals could be members despite their inability to
consciously participate within the group norms, although many of the group norms were reflective
of the totem animal's natural behavior. Under mechanistic solidarity, the norms were restrictive,
concerned with what could and could not be eaten, touched, or utilized. The punishment for not
adhering to these norms was repressive, resulting in censure, banishment or even death, if the
offence was particularly severe. It was quite possible for an animal to adhere to the norms, with or
without conscious effort on its part. It seems that if an animal were found guilty of eating a taboo
plant or fellow creature, it could be punished. Yet it is clear that animals were not knowingly
adhering to group norms. It was coincidence and instinct that gave early humans the impression that
their animal clan members were conforming to their rules.
It is also possible under this mode of solidarity for an animal to have a limited role within the
group. Dogs, for example, helped protect the clan. Horses helped in transportation. Other creatures
served as sacred objects, which allowed the group to focus its energy towards the societal goal.
However, one problem in appealing to mechanical solidarity as the method to bind humans to
animals is that Durkheim dismisses primitive cosmology as erroneous in The Elementary Forms of
Religious Life. The primitive group's way of carving up the universe was based upon bad science or
false notions. This error is the primitives' belief that an external force provides the method for
determining membership and that this same force authors norms for the group. Durkheim claims
that the group itself is responsible for both effects; thus the force is internal regardless of the
appearance that societal constraints are external. The constraint is from within the group itself, and
not suprahuman. Durkheim thus argues that the source of the norms and the method for determining
clan membership were misunderstood. Yet it does not necessarily follow that mechanical solidarity
has lost its usefulness. Current understanding of the world will allow the claim that the resources of
this planet are limited. If resources are not carefully utilized, the survival of the human species is at
risk. So we could create a cosmology that recognizes the interdependence of humans and animals,
without making reference to external divine beings. Such a cosmology is based upon a pragmatic
observation: humans must conserve the world's resources, including animals, in order to survive.
The other difficulty in an appeal to mechanical solidarity is the objection mentioned at the
beginning of this essay. Animals cannot knowingly adhere to group norms, particularly today's
social/moral norms. The question that must be answered is: must one know that she is following
norms in order to be a member of the group, or is mere adherence to norms sufficient? Mechanical
solidarity between humans and animals is possible only if we allow the following three concepts to
be equivalent.
C1. I do this because it is a rule.
C2. I do this because I get punished (or rewarded).
C3. I do this because I am forced (or trained).
Norms, particularly in a mechanical society, are constructed to repress certain behaviors in
individuals. The rules are in place to stop such behavior. Enforcement of rules is through a
punishment/reward system. Many human members adhere to rules in order to avoid punishment or
be rewarded. It is possible, though, that individuals may not consciously acknowledge that their
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behavior is based upon rule-adherence. If C1, C2 and C3 are allowed to be interchangeable, then
animals can adhere to rules, albeit unknowingly. Animals' limited capacity for understanding why
they follow rules would not undermine their membership. They would be expected to work within
the system established by humans, and their acceptance of the system would be exhibited by their
seeking reward over punishment. They would have a limited capacity to share in shaping group
goals and norms, and they would also have limited gains from these goals, corresponding to their
limited ability to adhere to norms. The rights animals gain would be reflective of their participation
in helping the group meet its goals.
ORGANIC SOLIDARITY.
Under an organic system sameness is not prized; difference is the key to successful attainment.
This solidarity is maintained through restitutory¾not repressive¾laws. Thus, interdependence is
contractual. As each individual becomes more specialized, the need for others is enhanced. One
agrees to participate within the group because doing so ensures success for the individual, as well
as the group. Organic solidarity is stronger due to the interdependence of group members. How
could animals find a place within such a group?
The dependence upon animals is clear. They are a resource, as well as a delight to humans. We
utilize them to meet many of our goals. Such solidarity might prove useful in binding humans to
norms that respect the rights of animals, but it would be a one-sided interaction. Animals could not
adhere to the pure organic method of rule adherence. They cannot bargain, nor contract. But they
can serve a specialized function; they can provide humans with food, clothing and companionship.
So an organic solidarity would provide a method of reparations to which humans could be subject if
they failed to acknowledge the moral worth of animal members. This would allow fines and
confiscation against humans if they proved themselves incapable of adhering to the norms that
protect animals. While organic solidarity will not provide an avenue for animals to participate
within norms, it does provide a method of affording animals more protection from inhumane
treatment. Thus it is possible for animals to be members of the group, based solely upon their
participation in the DOL.
OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES.
Membership within a social/moral group does carry rights as well as responsibilities. An objection
could be raised that it is unfair to obligate animals in this way, as they cannot knowingly participate
within the social/moral group. While it is true that they are unaware of the functions they serve, it
is also true that without participating in the social/moral structure in some sense, they will not be
ensured humane/moral treatment.
Animal social membership is not fully robust. It seems that membership is a matter of degree¾a
strong objection to tying moral worth to group membership, or DOL. Degrees of moral worth have
traditionally been rejected. Moral worth, or membership within a moral group, is considered by
traditionalists to be an either-or proposition, not a matter of degree. Acceptance of variances within
moral worth, or a hierarchical approach to moral worth, is necessary to adopting membership based
upon DOL. If one's social worth were determined by one's role within an interdependent society, it
would be possible to account for limited and non-limited membership within the group.
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If some functions are determined to be higher functioning, does it follow that humans could also be
assigned a lower moral status, like that of animals? Can humans be sacrificed to serve the greater
good? This is problematic. It seems quite easy to deny animals full-fledged membership, since they
do not have the capacity to recognize that they are members. Yet can we deny humans full-fledged
membership based upon this same criterion? Would mentally impaired members not be entitled to
full moral worth? Can they receive the rights without the responsibilities of repressive laws? If an
Alzheimer's patient failed to honor a norm that was deemed punishable, would they be subject to
punishment? No they would not, yet animals can be. It seems that the Alzheimer's victim is not
functioning within society, while animals are. Perhaps a case could be made for past functioning.
When someone (human or animal) can no longer serve her role, it does not follow that she is no
longer deemed of moral worth; she is deemed merely incapable of participating within the norms. It
is clear that this is still problematic, but the mentally diminished person would be entitled to rights
without responsibilities.
What about humans who have never functioned within the group, those born with mental
incapacities who have never worked for social goals or were socialized to follow group norms? A
case could be made that these humans serve an indirect function toward society in that they teach us
to be benevolent without requiring anything in return. While this would free us from excluding any
non-functioning humans from social/moral group membership, it weakens the claim that animals
belong only because they can serve a function.
Why not define their function as teaching humans to be benevolent? Many would find this
convincing, believing that the manner in which one treats animals is symptomatic of how one treats
humans. This would free animals from seeking membership by functioning directly in attainment of
societal goals and, instead, receiving their membership through an indirect function, like teaching
humans how to be benevolent. It is quite a difficult problem allowing humans to have indirect
function, while insisting that animals serve directly. It seems inconsistent, but perhaps it could be
resolved by stipulating that if a member can serve a direct function they should do so and, if not
then, an indirect function will serve to provide them with membership. This would apply to both
humans and animals. Both would be subjected to limited rights in accordance with their limited
responsibilities.
CONCLUSION.
While this solution to the tension between animal rights and human needs superceding animal needs
is not satisfactory, it is plausible. The same is true for the overall project of utilizing Durkheim's
DOL to establish moral worthiness within a human dominated social construction. While it is not a
complete picture, it does suggest a better method of handling the distinction between that which is
and that which is not a member of the social/moral group. It provides a larger membership while
considering the limits of some of its members. Rights and responsibilities are matters of degree,
which makes an unequal but fairer distribution of human treatment for both humans and animals. It
can be claimed that membership based upon DOL is a kinder, gentler inhumanity to animals. But it
seems that this is better than naively ignoring two facts: (1) humans do dominate the world at this
time, and (2) through this dominance, it is possible for animals to be regarded as not worthy of
moral treatment. Within a mechaorganic society, the proposed solution to providing solidarity
between animals and humans requires that animals receive some rights, but also responsibilities,
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without the animal's awareness. At the same time, humans will receive benefits from the animals
participating within DOL, but will also be held to stricter laws and punishments concerning their
treatment of these animal members.
This solution recognizes that animals should not be made to suffer, but it also recognizes that
human needs will outweigh animal needs. We cannot ignore that we are human, and that we will
promote the human species. But we also cannot ignore that the promotion of the human species is
interdependent upon the successful propagation of other species. There is an interdependence
between humans and the world around them. Humans will not survive if the planet does not
survive. Without animals, human goals will not be met, and without moral treatment animals will
be used as a mere means in support of our goals. We can no longer disallow membership of animals
within our social/moral group and still be considered a just society.
Eli Kanon
The Florida State University Tallahassee
ENDNOTES
1. The remainder of this paper will utilize the terminology of animal and human where animal
means non-human animal and human means human animal. This usage does not assume bias in
favor of either group; it is used merely to ease readability.
2. Halls, W.D. (trans.). 1997. The Division of Labor in Society by Emile Durkheim. New York.
The Free Press. pp. 2-3.
3. Ibid, pp. 104-106.
4. I have dubbed this mechaorganic solidarity.
5. Ibid, p. 102.
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